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Abstract 
 
In 2012 the Supreme Court of New Zealand ruled on Right to Life 
New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee. The case 
was brought by way of application for judicial review, with Right to 
Life New Zealand Inc arguing that the Supervisory Committee had 
made an error of law in interpreting its functions under the 
Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977. A majority of 
the Court held that the Supervisory Committee does not have the 
power to review decisions made by certifying consultants in 
individual cases. However, both the text and the purpose of the Act 
support the minority view, that the Supervisory Committee must 
seek information about individual cases in order to fulfil its functions 
under the Act. It appears that the majority judgment was motivated 
by policy concerns due to an arguable change in Parliamentary intent 
since 1977. The majority should have acknowledged the policy 
values that guided its decision or accorded with the minority view 
rather than straining the statutory wording. Either of those actions 
would have better prompted Parliament to reform the law to reflect 
modern circumstances.  
 
 
Key Words 
 
Abortion;  
Ambulatory approach;  
Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977; 
Judicial review; 
Legal realism. 
 
 
 
 
4 Emma Jane Smith 300193072 LAWS489 
 
 
I Introduction 
 
The Abortion Supervisory Committee has described New Zealand’s 
abortion law as “outdated”, “misleading”, and “demeaning to women”.
1
 Yet, 
despite widespread criticism, Parliament has consistently avoided the issue 
of reform. In 2012 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify the law 
when it heard an appeal regarding the Supervisory Committee’s function of 
ensuring that the abortion law is applied consistently and according to the 
law throughout New Zealand.
2
 It held by a 3-2 majority that the Committee 
is not required to seek information about individual cases in which an 
abortion is authorised in order to fulfil its functions under the Contraception, 
Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977 (the Act). 
 
In this paper I criticise the majority of the Supreme Court for failing to 
follow orthodox administrative law principles. Instead the Court has 
delivered a decision that appears to be motivated by political concerns. It 
seems likely that New Zealand’s abortion law will remain in its outdated 
form for the foreseeable future, as the decision failed to provide any much-
needed clarity or impetus for law reform. 
 
Part II of this paper explains the background and the legal issue arising in 
the case. The appellant, Right to Life NZ Inc, brought a judicial review 
claim against the Supervisory Committee, alleging that it was not fulfilling 
its statutory function. The legal issue related to the scope of its power to 
review the decisions of certifying consultants in individual cases. The 
appellant argued that the Supervisory Committee should scrutinise the 
reasons given for allowing an abortion in particular cases.
3
  
 
In Part III I offer a critique of the majority decision. My argument is that the 
minority interpreted the text and purpose of the Act more accurately. In this 
                                                
1  Abortion Supervisory Committee Report of the Abortion Supervisory Committee for 
2000 (2000, Wellington) at 5. 
2
  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee [2012] NZSC 
68, [2012] 3 NZLR 762. 
3  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee [2008] 2 NZLR 
825 (HC) at [4]. 
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section I also address the issue of the ambulatory approach to statutory 
interpretation. Although it is often said that the courts have a role in 
ensuring statutes are interpreted to reflect changing values, in cases such as 
the present it may be harmful for them to do so. 
 
Next, I criticise the majority judgment from a legal realist perspective, 
arguing that when the courts are confronted by questions of statutory 
interpretation where the statute no longer reflects societal values they should 
not attempt to disguise a political decision by straining the meaning of the 
statute. 
 
In Part V I explain why it is that the courts and administrative bodies may 
intervene in cases of clinical judgment by medical professionals. I draw an 
analogy with the dispensation of controlled drugs under the Misuse of Drugs 
Act 1975, and explain why the case law on which the majority relied does 
not preclude review of certifying consultants’ decisions in all cases. 
 
Finally, in Part VI I make a consequentialist critique about the majority’s 
findings that the Supervisory Committee’s current practice of making 
inquiries is inadequate;
4
 and that the Health and Disability Commissioner 
has a role in ensuring that the law is adhered to.
5
 I argue that neither of these 
findings sufficiently clarifies the law on abortion. Further, I argue that as a 
result of the majority judgment Parliament is unlikely to consider reform in 
the foreseeable future. 
 
II Background 
 
The case came to the Court by way of a judicial review application in which 
the appellant, Right to Life New Zealand Incorporated (Right to Life), 
argued that the Supervisory Committee was not fulfilling its statutory 
functions under the Act. Right to Life argued that the Supervisory 
Committee was required to scrutinise decisions made in individual cases, 
                                                
4
  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at 
[40]. 
5
  At [44]. 
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whereas the Committee alleged that it had no such power.
6
 In essence, Right 
to Life sought to establish that New Zealand has a de facto position of 
“abortion on demand”, contrary to the position at law.
7
 It argued that, 
because the Supervisory Committee is not fulfilling its statutory functions, 
abortions are approved in circumstances in which they should not be.
8
 In 
this section I explain the statutory context for the decision and then give an 
overview of the judgments handed down by the lower courts.  
 
A The Statutory Context 
 
In 1977 sweeping changes were made to New Zealand’s abortion law, as a 
result of a report of a Royal Commission of Inquiry established in 1975.
9
 
Since then, abortion has been governed by the Contraception, Sterilisation, 
and Abortion Act 1977, which largely adopted the recommendations made 
by the Royal Commission of Inquiry, and by ss 182 to 187A of the Crimes 
Act 1961.
10
 Essentially, procuring an abortion is a crime, except in certain 
circumstances where there is a legal justification. 
 
The Crimes Act 1961 provides that it is an offence to cause the death of any 
child that has not become a human being in such a manner that the offender 
would have been guilty of murder if the child had become a human being,
11
 
or to do certain unlawful actions with the intent to procure the miscarriage 
of any woman or girl.
12
 Section 187A provides that such acts will not be 
unlawful in certain cases. The particular exception that is at issue in this 
case is if the person procuring the abortion believes:
13
  
 
that the continuance of the pregnancy would result in serious danger (not 
being danger normally attendant on childbirth) to the life, or to the physical 
or mental health of the woman or girl. 
 
                                                
6
  At [1]. 
7  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 3, at 
[4]. 
8
  At [3]-[4]. 
9
  New Zealand Royal Commission on Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion 
Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion in New Zealand: Report of the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry (Government Printing Office, Wellington, 1977). 
10
  Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977, s 2, definition of “abortion law”. 
11
  Crimes Act 1961, s 182. 
12  Section 183. 
13
  Section 187A(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
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In its report, the Royal Commission of Inquiry made a number of 
recommendations to ensure the consistent administration of abortion law 
throughout the country. Important among these were the recommendations 
to help reduce the risk of bias from doctors. There is a risk that doctors will 
misapply the law and authorise or perform abortions in situations that do not 
fit within one of the section 187A exceptions. The Commission’s primary 
recommendation was that Parliament should establish a panel to make 
decisions in individual cases, and, as an alternative, that decisions as to 
whether to grant an abortion should be made by two doctors “under the 
general framework and supervision of the statutory committee”.
14
 Although 
the Commission acknowledged that there was still a risk that two doctors 
may be biased, and that decisions would be made inconsistently in different 
regions, it was this option that Parliament chose to implement.
15
 
 
The Supervisory Committee was set up in order to oversee the decisions 
made by doctors. It is provided for in s 10 of the Act, which requires that at 
least two of its members must be medical professionals. Under s 30 of the 
Act, the Committee maintains a register of certifying consultants. Every 
time a certifying consultant grants an abortion they are required to report to 
the Committee, giving non-identifying information about the patient, the 
pregnancy history, and an indication of the ground(s) upon which the 
abortion is justified. Sections 32-33 of the Act govern the procedure to be 
undertaken when a woman seeks an abortion. Its key functions are 
delineated in s 14. 
 
The appeal in question pertained to the correct interpretation of ss 14(1)(a), 
(i) and (k) of the Act. These require the Supervisory Committee: 
 
(a) To keep under review all the provisions of the abortion law, and the 
operations and effect of those provisions in practice: 
  ... 
(i) To take all reasonable and practicable steps to ensure that the 
administration of the abortion law is consistent throughout New 
                                                
14
  New Zealand Royal Commission on Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion, above 
n 9, at 297. 
15
  At 294. 
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Zealand, and to ensure the effective operation of this Act and the 
procedures thereunder: 
  ... 
(k) To report annually to Parliament on the operation of the abortion law. 
 
Section 36 of the Act is also relevant to the interpretation of the Supervisory 
Committee’s functions. It provides that certifying consultants shall keep 
records and submit to the Supervisory Committee such reports as required, 
but that none of these reports is to give the name or address of any patient. 
 
B Procedural History 
 
In this section I outline the decisions handed down by the lower courts as 
well the reasons given by both the majority and the minority in the Supreme 
Court.  
 
1 High Court 
 
In the High Court, Miller J held that the Supervisory Committee had 
misinterpreted its powers and that it is empowered to look at decisions made 
in individual cases. He expressed concerns about “the lawfulness of many 
abortions authorised by certifying consultants” in New Zealand.
16
 However 
he did not grant any relief, for the reasons that the Supervisory Committee 
must enjoy some kind of discretion in exercising its functions, and that with 
its role now clarified it could make the necessary changes itself, to ensure 
that it was conducting sufficient checks on certifying consultants.
17
 The 
judge was also concerned that, if the court was to make orders, this might 
result in its being drawn into supervision of the Supervisory Committee in a 
way that is inconsistent with the Act.
18
 His Honour considered that 
declaratory relief should be available, but the parties had agreed to consider 
the utility of any such declarations after the judgment had been given.
19
 
 
                                                
16
  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 3, at 
[5]. 
17
  At [154]- [155]. 
18 At [154]. 
19
  At [155]. 
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2 Court of Appeal 
 
On appeal the Supervisory Committee was successful, with a majority of the 
Court of Appeal (Chambers and Stevens JJ; Arnold J dissenting) holding 
that the Supervisory Committee did not have the power to review individual 
cases.
20
 The majority of the Court also expressed the view that Miller J was 
wrong to pronounce the view that there is reason to doubt the lawfulness of 
many abortions.
21
 The Court considered that it was not open to the 
Supervisory Committee to “form its own opinion about the lawfulness, 
including the clinical correctness, of the decisions of certifying consultants 
in particular cases. The Act characterised the decision of certifying 
consultants as a medical assessment pure and simple.”
22
 In the view of the 
majority, the power of review was provided for the Supervisory Committee 
to intervene only where certifying consultants were acting in bad faith.
23
 
 
Arnold J, in dissent, “found it difficult to see how the Supervisory 
Committee could meet its review obligation under s 14(1)(a) without having 
regard to the way that certifying consultants performed their functions under 
the Act.”
24
 In his view, it was unlikely that Parliament would have intended 
the reporting obligation to be so limited in scope that the Supervisory 
Committee could not question the reasons of certifying consultants in 
individual cases.
25
 Indeed, he reasoned, “one situation where the 
Supervisory Committee could properly revoke an appointment was where it 
became apparent that a certifying consultant was allowing his or her 
decisions about abortions to be influenced by an extreme view, whether 
liberal or conservative.”
26
 Parliament, in his Honour’s view, had “decided 
that abortion was not a matter to be left simply to the affected woman and 
her doctor,”
27
 and it is the role of the Supervisory Committee to ensure that 
abortion is allowed in practice only where it should be according to the law. 
                                                
20
  The Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc [2011] NZCA 
246, [2012] 1 NZLR 176. 
21
  At [136]-[137]. 
22  At [101]. 
23
  At [108]. 
24
  At [163]. 
25
  At [163]. 
26  At [172]. 
27
  At [178]-[179]. 
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3 Supreme Court 
 
A majority of the Supreme Court (Elias CJ, Blanchard and Tipping JJ; 
McGrath and William Young JJ dissenting) upheld the Court of Appeal 
decision.  
 
In the lower courts, Right to Life had also sought to establish that the law 
recognises an express right to life on the part of an unborn child and that s 8 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 guarantees the right of an 
unborn child to not be deprived of life. However, both the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal rejected this argument. The Supreme Court held that 
these grounds were untenable, and denied leave to appeal, because the Act is 
based on a common law principle which holds that various offences apply 
only to a child that has been born alive.
28
 
 
 (a) Majority decision 
 
The majority of the Supreme Court held that the Supervisory Committee 
cannot “make any inquiry or investigation into the decision-making in an 
individual case, where that would tend to question a decision actually made 
in a particular case.”
29
 That means that the Supervisory Committee may not 
inquire as to how a certifying consultant came to a diagnosis in a particular 
case. The majority reasoned that if Parliament had intended the power of 
review to be anything more than a general power, it would have made 
express provision and included appropriate safeguards for consultants.
30
  
 
Their Honours found it significant that s 36 of the Act distinguishes between 
“keeping” and “submitting” records: certifying consultants may keep more 
detailed records, but the section provides for them to submit only those 
records as the Supervisory Committee may from time to time require. To 
                                                
28  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee [2011] NZSC 
97 (Leave to Appeal). 
29
  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at 
[40], citing Wall v Livingston [1982] 1 NZLR 734 (CA). 
30   Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at 
[44]. 
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inquire into individual decisions would also raise privacy concerns, as “it 
would usually not be possible to reach a properly informed judgment on an 
individual decision without full access to the medical records ... and also full 
access to the patient whose identity and confidentiality the Act sets out to 
protect.”
31
  
 
Further, the majority reasoned that since the Act does not expressly provide 
the Supervisory Committee with statutory functions of establishing or 
enforcing professional obligations, expansive review powers would be 
illogical. The Supervisory Committee is not empowered to act as an 
investigatory or disciplinary body; that task is left to the Health and 
Disability Commissioner and the Medical Council.
32
  
 
The judgment endorsed the ruling in Wall v Livingston, where a 
paediatrician claimed that a girl should not have an abortion, even after two 
certifying consultants had permitted it.
33
 In that case the Court of Appeal 
held that the Supervisory Committee cannot make any inquiry into the 
decision-making in a particular case because to do so would be to question 
the correctness of a clinical judgment.
34
 The Court observed that the power 
of the Supervisory Committee is cast in very general terms, and that the 
“substitution of one set of medical opinions for others, as the result of some 
generally available process of review or appeal,” is not permitted.
35
 This, it 
considered, would amount to second-guessing the clinical judgment of a 
consultant. That is not contemplated by the Act, as the Supervisory 
Committee does not have any express power to look into the propriety of a 
consultant’s assessment in a particular case. 
 
Notably, although the majority essentially upheld the status quo as regards 
the Committee’s information-gathering function, the majority concluded its 
judgment by “recognising that each side has had some success”.
36
 It 
expressed a concern that the Supervisory Committee does not currently 
                                                
31  At [40]. 
32
  At [44]. 
33
  Wall v Livingston, above n 29, at 735. 
34
  At 741. 
35  At 738-739. 
36
  At [54]. 
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make inquiries as to how individual certifying consultants go about making 
decisions, and held that it ought to do so in order to fulfil its function of 
reviewing the law under section 14(1)(a).
37
 Implicit in this is the notion that 
the Supervisory Committee has not been correctly interpreting and applying 
its functions under the abortion law.  
 
 (b) Minority decision 
 
The minority emphasised the fact that section 14(1)(i) requires positive 
action by requiring the Supervisory Committee to take “all reasonable and 
practicable steps” to ensure that the policy goals are achieved. It is a key 
function of the Supervisory Committee to give certainty and uniformity to 
the operation of the Act: the Supervisory Committee is “statutorily entrusted 
with the supervision of the provisions of abortion law, particularly the 
decision-making under ss 32 and 33, and its role in this respect should not 
be read down.”
38
 Their Honours noted that s 14(1)(h) provides specifically 
for the Supervisory Committee to scrutinise the procedure by which 
consultants make decisions in individual cases, arguing that the Act’s 
emphasis on the importance of scrutiny “reflects the concern of the Royal 
Commission over the risk of intrusion of personal views into decisions of 
two doctors.”
39
 
 
Their Honours pointed out that the Supervisory Committee has the power to 
revoke appointments of certifying consultants, and so it follows that it must 
be able to find out whether consultants are practising or expressing views in 
a way that is inconsistent with the Act.
40
 The judges confined Wall v 
Livingston to situations where review of an abortion is attempted prior to the 
abortion being performed, arguing that the case “did not analyse 
comprehensively the role of the Supervisory Committee under the Act.”
41
 
Moreover, the minority was able to find support in that case for the view 
that sometimes “some investigation of particular decision-making may be 
                                                
37  At [46]. 
38
  At [97]. 
39
  At [81]. 
40
  Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977, s 30(5). 
41  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at 
[80]. 
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required” when the Supervisory Committee is exercising its function of 
appointing consultants under s 30(5).
42
 
 
Further, the minority reasoned that s 36 actually supports the view that 
certifying consultants should report on individual decisions, because “the 
stipulation that reports not contain the woman’s name and address indicates 
that Parliament envisaged reports could and would include details of 
particular cases, whilst still protecting patients’ privacy.”
43
 The fact that 
Parliament has chosen not to specify the content of reports is merely a 
reflection of the fact that the Supervisory Committee is an expert body, 
being made up of two medical professionals according to s 10 of the Act, 
and would know better than Parliament what types of information it would 
need in order to fulfil its functions.
44
 
 
III Critique: The Majority Failed to Follow Orthodox 
Administrative Law Principles 
 
The standard of review to which a decision-maker is susceptible will depend 
on “the nature of the public body, the particular function being performed, 
the context within which that function is being performed and what it is said 
has gone wrong.”
45
 In some recent cases the courts have applied a more 
deferential standard of review. For example in a commercial context the 
decision-makers have greater discretion and judicial review will often be 
limited to serious situations of fraud or bad faith.
46
 However, it is a 
fundamental part of the constitutional arrangements of New Zealand that 
allow for judicial review that “Parliament cannot be taken to have intended 
that decision-makers should determine exclusively questions of statutory 
decision-making.”
47
 In this case the Court was called on to deal with the 
                                                
42  Wall v Livingston, above n 29, at 738. 
43
  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at 
[85]. 
44
  At [85]. 
45  Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board [2008] NZCA 385, [2009] 
1 NZLR 776 at [85]. 
46
  See, for example, Mercury Energy v Electricity Corporation of NZ [1994] 2 NZLR 
385 (PC). 
47  See, for example, Bulk Gas Users Group v Attorney-General [1983] NZLR 129 (CA) 
at 133; Re Racel Communictaions Ltd [1981] AC 374 (HL) at 382-383 per Lord 
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Supervisory Committee’s exercise of a function that has a “significant 
impact on individuals”, that as such is clearly a public decision, making it 
the type of case for which a high standard of review is appropriate.
48
  
 
The decision-maker must “understand correctly and give effect to the law 
that regulates its decision-making power.”
49
 If the decision-making 
authority misconstrues its statutory power it commits a reviewable error of 
law.
50
 Important in this case is the principle that if a public body such as the 
Supervisory Committee has failed to act in circumstances where, under the 
empowering legislation, it ought to have, that is an “unlawful abdication of 
power, whether or not the authority’s inaction was deliberate, or based on an 
erroneous belief that it lacked jurisdiction to proceed.”
51
  
 
The Supervisory Committee finds its authority in the Contraception, 
Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977. The Act must be interpreted in light of 
its text and purpose.
52
 In this section I argue that the majority’s 
interpretation of the legislative provisions is flawed because it frustrates the 
text and purpose of the abortion law. 
 
A Text 
 
According to s 14 of the Act, the Supervisory Committee is required to 
“keep under review all the provisions of the abortion law, and the operation 
and effect of those provisions in practice”; “to take all reasonable and 
practicable steps to ensure that the administration of the abortion law is 
consistent throughout New Zealand, and to ensure the effective operation of 
this Act and the procedures thereunder”; and “to report annually to 
                                                                                                                                                   
Diplock; Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (3rd 
ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2007) at 835. 
48
  Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board, above n 47, at [28]. 
49
  Joseph, above n 49, at 885; CCSU v Minister of Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (HL) at  
410. 
50  Joseph, above n 49, at 919; Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission 
[1969] 2 AC 147 (HL) per Lord Reid. 
51
  Joseph, above n 49, at 909; See also Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food [1968] AC 997 (HL); Hammond v Hutt Valley and Bays Metropolitan Milk 
Board [1958] NZLR 720 (CA). 
52
  Interpretation Act 1999, s 5. 
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Parliament on the operation of the abortion law.”
53
 It has the power to 
require consultants to “keep records and report on cases they have 
considered, for the purpose of performing its statutory functions.”
54
 
 
While the Act is fairly prescriptive as to how the Supervisory Committee 
must perform its function of licensing institutions,
55
 it does not prescribe a 
form of reporting.
56
 Section 14 specifies the functions of the Supervisory 
Committee, but it does so in a way that is more a description of the 
Supervisory Committee’s purpose than an exhaustive list of activities that 
the Committee is required to undertake. Paragraph (i) recognises that the 
section does not contain every duty of the Committee - it is worded as a 
catch-all, giving the Supervisory Committee the function to “take all 
reasonable and practicable steps to ensure the effective operation of this 
Act”.
57
 Section 14(2) adds to this, providing that the Supervisory Committee 
has “all such reasonable powers, rights, and authorities as may be necessary 
to enable it to carry out its functions.” 
 
Parliament has given the Supervisory Committee a wide discretion to decide 
how its functions can best be fulfilled. The majority argued that if 
Parliament had intended for the Supervisory Committee to be able to require 
reports on individual cases it would have included some express provision.
58
 
However, I argue that the wide powers granted do allow for such a reporting 
requirement. The fact that Parliament has left the specific details of 
reporting up to the Supervisory Committee does not mean that it can use its 
wide discretion to circumvent its functions under the Act.
59
 It is important to 
note that, while the Supervisory Committee has discretion as to how it 
performs its functions, it does not have discretion as to whether or not it acts 
to perform them at all. The Supreme Court has recently held that even a 
broadly framed discretion must “always be exercised to promote the policy 
and objects of the Act … The exercise of the power will be invalid if the 
                                                
53
  Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977, s 14. 
54
  Section 36; Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, 
above n 3, at [5]. 
55
  Sections 19-25. 
56
  Right to Life v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at [23]. 
57
  Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977, s 14(1)(i) (emphasis added). 
58  Right to Life v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at [44]. 
59
  Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food , above n 53, at 1030 
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decision-maker ‘so uses his discretion to thwart or run counter to the policy 
and objects of the Act.’”
60
 There will often be cases where a public body 
with expertise in a particular area is given a broadly expressed power, but 
the courts will intervene if it exercises that power in a way that “cannot 
rationally be regarded as coming within the statutory purpose,” or if it fails 
to perform its functions under the empowering legislation.
61
  
 
The policy of the Act must be ascertained from reading the Act as a whole.
62
 
The role of the Supervisory Committee is to deal with licensing of certifying 
consultants,
63
 in order to ensure that the consultants on the register are 
following the correct statutory procedure for when an abortion is sought.
64
 It 
is tasked with maintaining a register of certifying consultants and has the 
power to revoke appointments where necessary.
65
 This power of revocation 
implies that the Supervisory Committee should be checking the performance 
of certifying consultants more frequently than only when their term ends. 
Inherent in this task is the function of determining whether consultants are 
making decisions that are inconsistent with the tenor of the Act.
66
 Thus the 
Supervisory Committee should be required to make inquiries into specific 
cases in order to understand exactly how diagnoses are made. Its function is 
systemic, but in order to understand “how the system is operating in practice 
for the purpose of reporting to Parliament, the Committee must ... be 
prepared to utilise its powers to consider the basis of individual decision-
making by certifying consultants.”
67
  
 
Section 36 of the Act supports this reading, as it provides that no identifying 
information about any woman shall be provided in reports to the 
Supervisory Committee. As the minority of the Supreme Court pointed out, 
this express stipulation “indicates that Parliament envisaged reports could 
                                                
60
  Unison Networks Ltd v Commerce Commission [2007] NZSC 74, [2008] 1 NZLR 42 
at [53]. See also Mercury Energy v Electricity Corporation of NZ, above n 48, at 5; 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 
223; Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004 at 1031. 
61
  Unison Networks Ltd v Commerce Commission, above n 62, at [55]. 
62
  At [53]; Joseph, above n 49, at 885. 
63  Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977, s 30. 
64
  See sections 32-33. 
65
  Section 14(1)(h). 
66
  Section 30(5). 
67  The Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc , above n 20, at 
[182]. 
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and would include details of particular cases.”
68
 In other words, if 
Parliament had not intended there to be reports about individual women then 
it would not have needed to include this stipulation, as it would be highly 
unlikely that consultants would give details about individual women in 
general reports. 
 
B Purpose 
 
I argue that the purpose of the abortion law is frustrated under the majority 
approach. Although it is arguable that Parliament’s intent today is different 
to that at the time of drafting, I argue that this is not an appropriate case for 
the Court to use the ambulatory approach to interpreting the Act. 
 
1 Purpose at the time of drafting 
 
The Act was introduced following a report of a Royal Commission of 
Inquiry that made several recommendations for reforming the law on 
abortion, and it largely followed the recommendations made in the report.
69
 
The Commission reported that “it is wrong, except for good reasons, to 
terminate unborn life,”
70
 and recognised that although an unborn child is not 
given the full set of rights that other human beings are, abortion 
extinguishes a potential life and so must be regarded seriously, and not 
merely left to the woman and her doctor to determine.
71
 This reflects the 
view of that era that abortion on demand is unsatisfactory.
72
 The fact that 
abortion is a criminal act except in certain circumstances reinforces this 
view.  
 
                                                
68
  Right to Life v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at [85]. 
69
  New Zealand Royal Commission on Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion, above 
n 9. 
70
  At  198-199; Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, 
above n 3, at [1]. 
71
  New Zealand Royal Commission on Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion, above 
n 9, at 274, 289; Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory 
Committee, above n 3, at [1]. 
72
  See, for example, WAP Facer Legal Abortion in New Zealand (New Zealand 
Rationalist Association, Auckland, 1977) at 7; Jocelyn Brooks and others Ill 
Conceived: Law and Abortion in Practice in New Zealand (Caveman Press, Dunedin, 
1981) at 66. 
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The purpose of the Act is to “provide for the circumstances and procedures 
under which abortions may be authorised, after having full regard to the 
rights of the unborn child” and it must be read in conjunction with ss 182 to 
187A of the Crimes Act 1961.
73
 Overall, the purpose is to make sure that 
certifying consultants do not authorise abortions in circumstances that are 
clearly not contemplated by the justifications in s 187A of the Crimes Act. 
Thus it follows that the Supervisory Committee must require consultants to 
report in more detail on individual cases, to ensure that every abortion 
performed is in fact within the scope of s 187A.  
  
Accordingly, the Commission recommended that a committee be set up “to 
have general oversight of the administration of abortion law ... and give 
general supervision to the working of the abortion law.”
74
 The model that 
Parliament chose to implement, the “two doctors” model, was not the 
Commission’s primary recommendation as it recognised that there was a 
risk that doctors would give effect to their own personal views,
75
 but it 
considered that the risk was mitigated by “the supervision and oversight 
which the statutory committee would give.”
76
 This suggests that its 
oversight role is important in the context of the abortion law as a whole, and 
supports the view that the Supervisory Committee should have the power to 
make detailed inquiries about the decisions made in particular cases.  
 
2 Purpose today 
 
The Supervisory Committee has consistently drawn Parliament’s attention 
to its concerns that the Act is operating more liberally in practice than it 
legally ought to, expressing a concern that consultants were relying too 
frequently on dubious mental health diagnoses.
77
 In its 2005 report 
acknowledged that although “the law was written with precision, and 
enacted by careful lawmakers ... the wording has come to have a de facto 
                                                
73
  Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977, long title. 
74  New Zealand Royal Commission on Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion, above 
n 9, at 25. 
75
  At 294. 
76
  At 294. 
77  Abortion Supervisory Committee Report of the Abortion Supervisory Committee for 
1996 (1996). 
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liberal interpretation. Case law does not refute the understanding. The 
Supervisory Committee has therefore no choice but to accept that this is the 
intent.”
78
 Parliament has consistently failed to act on any of the concerns 
reported by the Committee, so it would appear that it is not troubled by the 
high number of abortions being granted on the mental health ground. This 
suggests that Parliament’s intent is now that the law should operate in 
practice so as to provide women in New Zealand with the right to abortion 
on demand.  
 
3 Why an ambulatory approach is not appropriate in this case 
 
An ambulatory approach to interpreting the role of the Supervisory 
Committee may support the majority decision in this case. It may be said 
that since Parliament is less concerned about the legality of abortions under 
the Crimes Act than it was at the time of setting up the Supervisory 
Committee, the Supervisory Committee’s role has changed and the 
legislation should be interpreted in a way that reflects this.
 79
   
 
Often an ambulatory approach is useful where the courts need to reinterpret 
words that do not reflect modern circumstances. For example, in Re 
Application by AMM and KJO, the Court had to interpret the outdated 
Adoption Act 1955.
80
 The Act only allowed a joint application for adoption 
to be made by a “spouse”; the couple that applied in this case were in a 
long-term de facto relationship. The Court reasoned that Parliament’s intent 
in using the word “spouse” was to ensure that adopted children could grow 
up in stable, committed families. That intention did not change over time, 
nor would it be frustrated if the Court adopted a wider definition of the word 
“spouse”, as society now acknowledges that other forms of relationships can 
provide stable and committed environments for children.  
 
However, here the Court is not merely interpreting a word or words in order 
to give effect to the purpose of the Act; the “real complaint here is simply 
                                                
78
  Abortion Supervisory Committee Report of the Abortion Supervisory Committee for 
2005 (2005). 
79  See Interpretation Act 1999, s 6. 
80
  Re Application by AMM and KJO to adopt a child [2010] NZFLR 629 (HC). 
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that the original meaning of [the] Act has become inappropriate. This is a 
matter for the legislature.”
81
 Dynamic statutory interpretation is not 
appropriate where the courts “are not appropriate representatives or are not 
accountable for their mistakes.”
82
 The Court should not assume that society 
as a whole accepts abortion on request. The courts are limited in their ability 
to determine whether a point of view is widely held in the community, 
“since the community does not normally participate in litigation.”
83
 
Moreover, the difficulty in identifying community values is greater where 
society is “clearly divided on the particular issue: where there are different 
sets of values ... which are strongly, even tenaciously, held.”
84
  
 
 This attitude is reflected in such controversial cases as R v Hines, and 
Quilter v Attorney-General, where the judgments handed down demonstrate 
that all judges were influenced by an assessment of whether the court of the 
legislature was the more appropriate law-making body and a concern that 
the Court should not go beyond interpretation and give a strained meaning 
to the statutory provisions.
85
 However in this case both the majority and 
minority judgments are written as questions of basic statutory interpretation, 
with the court ostensibly trying to give effect to Parliament’s intent as 
expressed through the wording of the Act.
86
 There is no discussion of 
whether the Court is overreaching or giving the wording a meaning that it is 
not realistically able to bear. This is problematic because the “judicial 
updating of statutes will usually raise issues appropriate for legislative 
resolution, as there will be scope for different views on the desirability, or at 
least the proper form, of updating.”
87
  
 
                                                
81
  Mark Bradley “The Ambulatory Approach at the Bottom of the Cliff: Can the Courts 
Correct Parliament’s Failure to Update Legislation?” (2003) 9 Canterbury L. Rev. 1 at 
14. 
82
   William Eskridge “Dynamic Statutory Interpretation” (1987) 135 Univ. Penn. Law 
Rev. 1479 at 1529. 
83  Bruce Harris “Judicial Activism and New Zealand’s Appellate Courts” in Brice 
Dickson (ed) Judicial Activism in Common Law Supreme Courts (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2007) 273 at 301. See also Sir Ivor Richardson “The Role of Judges 
as Policy Makers” (1985) 15 VUWLR 46 at 49. 
84  Sir Ivor Richardson “The Role of Judges as Policy Makers, above n 85, at 52. 
85
  R v Hines [1997] 3 NZLR 529 (CA); Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 
(CA); Harris, above n 85, at 320. 
86
  See, for example, Right to Life v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at 
[44], [86], [96]. 
87
  Bradley, above n 83, at 17. 
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Although there may be evidence that Parliament does not intend the 
abortion law to be applied strictly in the modern context, where the 
legislature’s language “fail[s] to capture its practical choice” it is not open to 
the courts to permit themselves “a strained or perverse interpretation of the 
words of a statute,” in order to avoid an outcome that they view as 
undesirable.
88
 While the legislature may have particular hopes or 
expectations, those must be distinguished from the legislative purpose as 
embodied in the enactment.
89
 Moreover, although the use of extrinsic 
material to aid in statutory interpretation is now widely accepted, it should 
be “rarely the case that parliamentary materials will provide the central 
reason for choosing an interpretation, and it is extremely rare that such 
evidence would trump an interpretation based on the face of the text 
itself.”
90
 This must be especially so in this case, where, rather than the Court 
relying on contemporary statements from the time the Act was passed, any 
parliamentary material that might justify the majority decision can only be 
inferred from its inaction.  
 
IV Critique: Legal Realism 
 
In this section I argue that judges should acknowledge the personal and 
political views that “colour their legal decisions.”
91
 This is especially so 
when the Court is called on to deal with a politically-charged issue. In such 
cases, judges should confront the reality of what they are doing and 
acknowledge that they are, at least in part, making their decisions on the 
basis of the current social climate rather than seeking to “clothe their 
personal judgment with the imprint of an impersonal law.”
92
  
 
                                                
88  D F Dugdale  “Framing Statutes in an Age of Judicial Supremacy” (2000) 9 Otago L. 
Rev. 603 at 607. 
89
  Richard Ekins “The Relevance of the Rule of Recognition” (2006) 31 Australian 
Journal of Legal Philosophy 95, at 116.  
90  Catherine Iorns Magallanes “The Just Do It Approach to Using Parliamentary History 
Materials in Statutory Interpretation” (2009) 15 Canterbury L Rev 205 at 205. 
91
  Brian Tamanaha “The Several Meanings of Politics in Judicial Politics Studies: Why 
Ideological Influence is not Partisanship” (2012) 61 Emory Law Journal 759 at 762. 
92  E W Thomas “A Return to Principle in Judicial Reasoning and an Acclamation of 
Judicial Autonomy” (1993) VUWLR Monograph 5 at 51. 
22 Emma Jane Smith 300193072 LAWS489 
 
If judges acknowledge the political or moral basis for controversial 
decisions, they will also be forced to justify those views.
93
 Thomas J has 
argued that if judges took a more principle-oriented approach, the 
“importance of providing reasons [would] be accentuated ... [the judge 
would] be required to expound the considerations which have instructed 
them in reaching their conclusion. In many cases this [would] mean 
articulating, as best as possible, the reasons and considerations which led to 
the value judgment on which the decision is based,” making judges more 
directly responsible for their decisions.
94
  For example, in Re Application by 
AMM and KJO, the High Court undertook an analysis of how exactly 
societal values had changed and acknowledged this was the main reason for 
giving a wide scope to the word “spouse”.
95
  
 
The majority decision in this case appears to be based on a perception, also 
reflected in the lower courts, that Parliament and society as a whole are 
more accepting of abortion on demand.
96
 However the Court did not 
acknowledge this, beyond making reference to the fact that Parliament does 
not appear to be troubled by the high number of abortions being granted on 
the mental health ground and that the Supervisory Committee’s calls for 
reform of the law have gone unheeded.
97
 This suggests that the majority saw 
Parliament’s intent as being that the law should operate in practice so as to 
provide women in New Zealand with the right to abortion on demand. The 
majority should have made it clear that this was central to its decision, 
rather than feeling compelled to cloak its reasoning in administrative law 
arguments. This would have forced the majority to undertake a more robust 
analysis of its views, and so would have allowed Parliament to make it clear 
whether or not it agreed. 
                                                
93
  See Dr James A Farmer QC “Lord Cooke and Judicial Decision-Making - A 
perspective from the Commercial Bar” in Paul Rishworth (ed) The Struggle for 
Simplicity: Essays for Lord Cooke of Thorndon (Butterworths, Wellington, 1997) at 
54; Robin Cooke “The New Zealand National Legal Identity” (1987) 3 Canterbury L 
Rev 171. 
94
  At 59. 
95
  Re Application by AMM and KJO to adopt a child, above n 82, at [34]-[37]. 
96  See Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, 
at [25]; The Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc, above 
n 20, at [120]; Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, 
above n 3, at [58]. 
97  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at 
[25]. 
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V The Role of the Law in Scrutinising the Clinical    
 Decisions of Medical Professionals 
 
Many of the Supervisory Committee’s arguments related to the notion that 
certifying consultants are professional people who must be given freedom to 
exercise their clinical judgment, without fear of the “judge over their 
shoulder”.
98
  However, it is misleading to suggest that just because abortion 
is a medical procedure, the decision of whether or not to perform an 
abortion in any given case should be left entirely to the judgment of a 
medical professional. In this section I compare the functioning of the 
abortion law with the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 in order to demonstrate that 
the courts can review clinical decisions made by medical practitioners, and 
explain why Wall v Livingston is not of as wide application as the majority 
held.  
 
There are many instances where clinical decisions are susceptible to review. 
For example, High Court judges have the power to make orders discharging 
from hospital patients that have been “illegally” detained under the Mental 
Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992.
99
 That is a clear 
instance of a legal test being applied to review a medical decision and it has 
been described as an important supervisory function of the Court.
100
 
Similarly, in cases of persons who are not able to manage their own affairs 
the Courts have jurisdiction to determine whether medical procedures 
satisfy the relevant legal test, of the “least restrictive intervention 
possible”.
101
   
 
A Analogy with the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 
 
The Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act defines “abortion law” as 
including the relevant provisions of the Crimes Act, so the function of the 
Committee in supervising the abortion law must be read in conjunction with 
                                                
98
  See Joseph, above n 49, at 832. 
99
  Section 84(3). 
100  Re M [1992] 1 NZLR 29 (HC). 
101
  Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, ss 6-10. 
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the criminal provisions. It is significant that procuring an abortion in a 
situation that is not justified under s 187A is a criminal act. Parliament 
cannot have intended that the Supervisory Committee be tasked with 
ensuring the abortion law is applied consistently and accordance with the 
law, rather than in situations where to procure an abortion would be a 
criminal offence, whilst also intending that it does not have the power to 
investigate whether criminal actions are being carried out in individual 
cases. The Supervisory Committee’s information-gathering function is 
critical to this role.  
 
The Misuse of Drugs Act provides a pertinent analogy. The Misuse of 
Drugs Regulations 1977 provide for dispensing practitioners to distribute 
certain controlled drugs, such as methadone.
102
 A practitioner’s decision to 
dispense those drugs can be likened to the decision to allow a woman to 
proceed with an abortion, as it involves a degree of clinical judgment. 
Dispensing practitioners are required to keep records including the surname, 
initials, and address of the person who prescribed the drugs, and to whom 
the drugs were prescribed, as well as the date and the amount of the drug.
103
  
 
Using or dispensing controlled drugs is, like abortion, prima facie a criminal 
offence, unless it can be justified by a narrowly defined set of 
circumstances.
104
 A key purpose of the record-keeping requirement is to 
ensure that licensed pharmacists and practitioners are not prescribing 
controlled drugs in situations not contemplated by the law.
105
 Thus the 
underlying purpose is the same as that of the abortion law. Without record-
keeping and auditing “there would be no way in which offences would 
come to light.”
106
  
 
B Critique of the Majority’s Reliance on Wall v Livingston 
 
The majority relied heavily on Wall v Livingston in which the Court of 
Appeal held that the Supervisory Committee cannot interfere with the 
                                                
102
  Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 8(1), Sch 1-3. 
103
  Misuse of Drugs Regulations 1977, reg 37. 
104
  Editorial “Supervision of Abortion” [2012] 8 NZLJ at 257.  
105  At 257; Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, ss 6, 8. 
106
  At 257. 
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medical judgment of certifying consultants.
107
 The case is cited as having 
settled the position that the Supervisory Committee cannot interfere with the 
medical judgment of certifying consultants. However, I argue that the ratio 
decidendi of Wall v Livingston is not of general application and should not 
be seen to preclude review of certifying consultants’ decisions after the 
abortion has taken place. 
 
The Court of Appeal in that case cited three reasons for the absence of any 
review process in the Act itself:
108
  
 
First, special attention has been given in the Act to the preservation of 
anonymity of the woman patient. Secondly, the whole process of 
authorisation appears designed to place fairly and squarely upon the 
medical profession as represented in any particular case by the certifying 
consultants a responsibility to make decisions which will depend so very 
much upon a medical assessment pure and simple. And thirdly, there are the 
adverse medical implications which could arise from the passage of time 
should such a determination be easily open to review. 
 
However, none of these observations supports the majority view. First, 
requiring consultants to report on specific cases does not necessarily 
constitute a breach of the patient’s privacy or anonymity. Indeed, the Act 
explicitly provides that reports shall not contain identifying information 
about individual women.
109
 To the extent that privacy is a concern, the fact 
that Parliament has decided that abortion is not a matter to be left simply to 
the woman and her doctor demonstrates a Parliamentary intent “to interfere 
with the privacy interests of women seeking abortions and with their 
professional relationships with their medical advisers.”
110
  
 
Secondly, while the process does rely on the clinical judgment of two 
consultants, the fact that Parliament has chosen to create a statutory body to 
oversee the functioning of abortion law and to manage the appointments of 
those consultants, demonstrates that the consultants are accountable for their 
                                                
107  Wall v Livingston, above n 29; Right to Life v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, 
above n 2, at [36]-[40], [44]. 
108
  Wall v Livingston, above n 29, at 738-739. 
109
  Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977, s 36(2). 
110  The Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc, above n 20, at 
[178]. 
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decisions. While the Supervisory Committee is not able to interfere with 
medical assessments made in specific cases, an after-the-fact power of 
review as to whether consultants are making those assessments in 
accordance with the Act is entirely consistent with its function under s 
14(1)(h). 
 
Thirdly, the “adverse medical implications” that the Court contemplated 
would only arise if a review were permitted before an abortion was carried 
out, as Dr Wall attempted in that case. Where the abortion has been 
performed, a review of the certifying consultant’s decision will have no 
effect on the woman involved. The Supervisory Committee is required “to 
make revocation/re-appointment decisions.”
111
 Part of that role requires the 
Supervisory Committee to review the work of consultants to determine 
whether or not they are making assessments in a neutral fashion and in 
accordance with the criminal law. 
 
Thus it is clear that the concerns articulated in Wall v Livingston are valid in 
the circumstances of that case, but they are not of general application. It is 
the Supervisory Committee’s role to scrutinise individual decisions to check 
that the abortion law, in the context of the criminal law, is being followed in 
practice. 
 
VI The Practical Effect of the Majority Decision 
 
The Committee has frequently suggested that certifying consultants are 
applying s 187A more liberally than Parliament intended, but expressed the 
view that it could do nothing about the situation.
112
 This indicates that the 
current reporting practice is inadequate. In response to these concerns, the 
majority held that the Supervisory Committee is required to question 
individual practitioners about how they come to such a conclusion, 
113
 and 
that it is for the Health and Disability Commissioner to address concerns 
                                                
111
  At [179]. 
112
  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 3, at 
[50]; Abortion Supervisory Committee Report of the Abortion Supervisory Committee 
for 2005 (2005). 
113
  Right to Life v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at [40]. 
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about certifying consultants who are misapplying the law. In this section I 
argue that neither of these will make much practical difference and that the 
better approach would have been for the majority to interpret the law in line 
with the minority approach, thus putting pressure on Parliament to consider 
reforming the law. 
 
A Requiring the Supervisory Committee to Make Inquiries of  
 Individual Certifying Consultants 
 
To hold that the Supervisory Committee needs to make more robust 
inquiries of individual certifying consultants, in order to give effect to the 
purpose of the abortion law, is arguably inconsistent with the majority’s 
view that the law is operating as intended. It is also unlikely to have much 
practical effect as no changes have been made to the form which certifying 
consultants are required to fill out as a result of the decision.
114
 The standard 
form requires consultants to provide information about the patient’s date of 
birth, socio-economic group and pregnancy history. It also requires the 
consultant to specify the ground, or grounds, on which the abortion is 
justified. There is only one line provided for the consultant to give more 
information about the particular ground, but given the small space provided 
this information is minimal in scope. Moreover, the current reporting 
process is one form per abortion request, rather than reports being grouped 
by consultant. It is difficult to see how the Committee could use information 
gathered in this way to check up on individual certifying consultants.  
 
B The Role of the Health and Disability Commissioner 
 
The majority also held that it was the role of the Health and Disability 
Commissioner to address concerns about certifying consultants who were 
misapplying the law. However, even if this is correct, it is not inconsistent 
for the Supervisory Committee to also have extensive review powers.
115
 Its 
role is limited to supervision and oversight, but with a power and 
                                                
114
  Letter from Rachael Cole (Secretary of the Abortion Supervisory Committee) to 
Emma Smith regarding an Official Information Act Request (16 May 2013). 
115  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at 
[93].  
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requirement to make any complaints to the Commissioner, who is 
responsible for taking disciplinary action. This kind of overlap is managed 
in other contexts where a specific body exercises a role in relation to 
standards of professional conduct, but the police have the power to 
investigate possible breaches of criminal law. This enables each body to 
adequately perform its role.
116
 
 
The Supervisory Committee does not make a practice of reporting any 
concerns to the Commissioner. Some patients have made complaints about 
individual certifying consultants and other professionals, such as 
counsellors, involved in the abortion process,
117
 but the office of the Health 
and Disability Commissioner has no record of ever having received a 
referral from the Committee.
118
 The Supervisory Committee has reported 
some cases to the police, but not in the numbers one would expect in light of 
its concerns as reported to Parliament; in 2004 the Supervisory Committee 
referred only four cases the police.
119
 Moreover, while a process reliant on 
complaints to the Health and Disability Commissioner is likely to be 
effective in cases where a woman complains that a consultant has not given 
her sufficient information or denied her application for an abortion 
unreasonably, it seems unlikely that patients will complain about a 
certifying consultant who authorises abortions in situations not 
contemplated by the law.  
 
C Is Reform of the Abortion Law Likely As a Result of This  
 Case? 
 
The majority decision has effectively rendered the Supervisory Committee’s 
role redundant. It may continue to draw Parliament’s attention to the fact 
that the abortion law is being applied more liberally than the wording of the 
statute permits, but Parliament will likely continue to do nothing. The law 
                                                
116  At [93]. 
117
  The Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc, above n 20, at 
[126]. 
118
  Letter from Rachael Cole, above n 114. 
119  The Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc, above n 20, at 
[127]. 
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has thus lost the “ability to respond to new conditions and attitudes”.
120
 
Although the courts can provide “a window of opportunity” for issues that 
are “temporarily blocked in the political arena”,
121
 I argue that in the case of 
abortion, this decision has removed any Parliamentary impetus to reform the 
law and is an example of the courts overstepping their constitutional role. 
 
If the Court had correctly interpreted the law according to the text and 
purpose as embodied in that text, Parliament would have been forced to 
confront the fact that abortion law in New Zealand is outdated and no longer 
in accordance with the views of the general public. While it is possible that 
in such a case Parliament would have retained the more conservative 
position embodied in the Act, that seems unlikely given its lack of action in 
response to the Supervisory Committee’s frequently noted concerns, and 
given its lack of response to the decision in this case. In either case, such a 
chain of events would have better given effect to the Court’s constitutional 
role and to the idea of dialogue between the Courts and Parliament leading 
to strong law-making.
122
 
 
VII Conclusion 
 
Although the majority of the Supreme Court recognised that “each side has 
had some success” in the final appeal of the case of Right to Life New 
Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, this does not appear to 
be the case. Many welcomed the decision, as it appeared to effectively 
uphold the status quo of de facto abortion on demand in New Zealand. 
 
This paper has demonstrated that there is reason to doubt the conclusions of 
the majority. The issue before the Court was one of statutory interpretation, 
and this essay has argued that, in light of the text and purpose of the 
Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act, the Supervisory Committee 
necessarily has the power to scrutinise individual decisions. The functions 
                                                
120
  Brooks, above n 74, at 99. 
121
  Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings PressureThrough Law (Routledge, London, 
1992) at 173. 
122  See Philip Joseph “Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise” (2004) 
15 KCLJ 321 at 330. 
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of the Supervisory Committee are described in very broad terms and it has 
wide powers to do anything that is reasonably necessary to fulfil its 
functions under the Act. Its key function is to ensure that abortions are 
performed consistently throughout New Zealand in circumstances where 
they are justified under s 187A of the Crimes Act. Central to this is the 
ability to check that certifying consultants are not expressing views that are 
either too liberal or too conservative for the tenor of the legislation. This 
was what the Royal Commission had in mind when it reported on the state 
of abortion law and recommended the changes that were enacted. 
 
Although abortion is a matter that requires some degree of discretion and 
clinical judgment, the Supervisory Committee has a role in checking that 
medical professionals are in fact exercising their clinical judgment in line 
with the abortion law, and not just expressing their personal moral views. If 
the Supervisory Committee does not seek information about the reasons for 
granting an abortion in particular cases, “its ability to exercise its functions 
will be severely curtailed, and the Parliamentary purposes of consistent 
administration of the abortion law in accordance with the statutory criteria 
for lawful abortions will not be fulfilled.”
123
  
 
Underlying the majority decision is a set of policy values about the desired 
state of the abortion law. It may well be argued that Parliament’s intent in 
modern circumstances, as opposed to when the Act was passed in 1977, is 
that we should have abortion on demand. Nevertheless, that is contrary to 
the statutory text and purpose. This paper has criticised the majority 
judgment for misinterpreting the statute, a decision that reflects theories of 
politics in judging. While it may be desirable in certain cases for the 
judiciary to ascertain the public mood and deliver judgments that reflect the 
social attitudes of the times, such practice undermines the constitutional role 
of the judiciary and the principle of the separation of powers. Abortion law 
is governed by statute and any real change should come from Parliament, 
not from the Courts. Although the parliamentary process can be slow, it 
“allows wider consultation and debate, and is likely to produce better law 
                                                
123
  Right to Life v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at [96]. 
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because the legislature is not constrained by the existing statutory text.”
124
 
Now that the Courts have strained the statutory wording, Parliament is 
unlikely to view reform with any urgency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
124  Bradley, above n 83, at 17; J F Burrows and R I Carter Statute Law in New Zealand 
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